Given a collection of selfish agents who wish to establish links to route traffic among themselves, the set of equilibrium network topologies may appear quite different from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the quality (price of anarchy) of equilibrium networks in a game where links require the consent of both participants and are negotiated bilaterally and compare these networks to those generated by an earlier model due to Fabrikant et al. [6] in which links are formed unilaterally. We provide a characterization of stable and efficient networks in the bilateral network formation game, show that the set of stable networks is richer than those in the unilateral game, and that all stable networks of the unilateral game are also stable in the bilateral game. We also provide an upper and lower bound on the price of anarchy (tight in the size of the network n but not the link cost α) of the bilateral game and show that the worst-case price of anarchy of the bilateral model is worse than for the unilateral model. A careful empirical analysis demonstrates that the average price of anarchy is better in the bilateral connection game than in the unilateral game for small link costs but worse as links become more expensive. In the process, a powerful equivalence between link-based graph stability and two game-theoretic equilibrium notions is also discussed. The equivalence establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium in the bilateral game that helps provide a partial geometric characterization of equilibrium graphs.
INTRODUCTION
Many network settings involve strategic peer selection by independent agents which can be modeled game-theoretically as network formation. These networks are formed endogenously by the actions of agents selfishly maximizing an individual objective function. For this reason, the overall efficiency of such networks, which are the stable outcomes of decentralized strategic interactions, can be worse than the network(s) formed by a central authority maximizing aggregate utility. Understanding this tension between stability and efficiency lies at the heart of our investigation into network formation.
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1] [2] coin the term price of anarchy to refer to the increase in cost caused by independent selfish behavior with respect to the centralized, social welfare-maximizing solution. The price of anarchy has received much attention in games dealing with various networking issues, such as load balancing [3] [4], routing [2] , and flow control [5] . This paper is part of a growing body of literature [6] [7] [8] [9] that studies the price of anarchy in network design, where individuals decide whether or not to form links in a shared network.
In many networking applications agents' interactions are regulated by an intermediary. For this reason, we are interested in how the rules governing the network formation process affect the game's equilibrium outcomes. We study how the quality of worst-case and average-case equilibrium networks differ between a network formation game where link creation requires bilateral consent as compared to a setting where links can be established unilaterally. We view the distinction between bilateral and unilateral formation as something that can be controlled through rules enforced by an intermediary.
The network design game that we study is based on a communication network model by Fabrikant et al. [6] in which agents are nodes and their strategy choices create an undirected graph. We augment the model by having links formed bilaterally (instead of unilaterally) and having the cost of links shared equally between participating nodes. The incorporation of consent represents a natural, realistic extension for a model where traffic routing costs are incurred at both ends of a link.
The bilateral connection game is described as follows. Each node simultaneously chooses a (possibly empty) subset of the other nodes in the game, and a link between any two nodes is established if it has the consent of both parties directly involved in the link. The intersection of these sets of edges is the resulting graph. The edges are undirected, meaning that they can be used to route traffic in both directions. Payoffs are construed as costs, meaning that agents are trying to minimize their respective costs of participating in the network, and the cost incurred by an agent is expressed quite generally as a trade-off between the cost of establishing links to other agents and its proximity to the rest of the network. We refer to the model by Fabrikant et al. [6] as the unilateral connection game, which differs from ours in that agents can unilaterally establish links and in the requisite solution concepts for the different models' evaluation. 
Our Results
The main contributions of this paper are the following: We show that the worst-case price of anarchy of the bilateral model is worse than for the unilateral model and provide an upper and lower bound on the price of anarchy (tight in the size of the network n but not the link cost α) of the bilateral connection game. This is a somewhat counter-intuitive result since we might expect that coordination between players would only mediate the problem of self-interested behavior. We also provide a characterization of stable and efficient networks in the bilateral connection game, show that the set of stable networks is richer than that of the unilateral connection game, and that all stable networks of the unilateral game are also stable in the bilateral game. We conduct a careful empirical analysis that demonstrates that the average price of anarchy is better in the bilateral connection game than in the unilateral game for small link costs but worse as links become more expensive. We explain this by observing that the bilateral setting leads to networks with more links, on average. Along the way, we show the equivalence between a network stability concept called pairwise stability and a two-player coalitional refinement of Nash called pairwise Nash as well as a strong non-cooperative solution concept termed a proper equilibrium. The equivalence establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium in the bilateral game that helps provide a partial geometric characterization of equilibrium graphs. The approach illustrates how the correspondence between different solution concepts in certain games can be leveraged to gain structural insight into equilibrium graphs.
The rest of the paper takes the following form: We first discuss related work before a formal introduction of the connection games in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the equilibrium and network stability notions that underlie much of our analysis. In Section 4, we provide our main results characterizing and comparing the set of stable and efficient network geometries in both the unilateral and bilateral connection games. Section 5 presents empirical analysis comparing the two games. Section 6 concludes.
Related Work
Fabrikant et al. [6] study a network creation game in the context of communication networks where links are generated by the unilateral actions of players and link costs are one-sided. Our bilateral network creation model may be 1 The incorporation of consent forces us to use a refinement of the Nash equilibrium.
better suited for modeling communication network design, given that interconnect costs are typically two-sided.
There is a growing interest in understanding how simple rules of engagement established by a system designer will affect the functioning of a networked system maintained endogenously by the strategic actions of participants [8] [10] . In order to understand the role of bilateral consent in strategic network formation, we compare equilibria and bounds on the price of anarchy in our bilateral network creation game with the unilateral model proposed by Fabrikant et al. [6] .
Anshelevich et al. [7] [8] study a different cost-sharing network connection game where, given an undirected graph structure G, players have a set of specified terminal nodes that they would like to see connected in the purchased network (which is necessarily a subgraph of G). In [8] , they study how fair cost allocation schemes affect the quality of the best Nash equilibrium network, and so understand the protocol constraining agents' interactions as suggesting an equilibrium outcome. Our model includes only local costsharing and our interaction protocol is restricted to a rule for how individual links are formed and severed, and does not propose a specific equilibrium. Of mention is that the socially efficient solution is stable for both connection games we consider.
Lopez-Pintado [11] and Melendex-Jimenez [12] both consider bilateral network formation models with local cost sharing, but their models differ from our own in the payoff structure and the equilibrium concepts applied. Payoffs in both these models are link-separable and derived from underlying (anti-)coordination games, while the benefits of connections in our bilateral game are formulated in terms of a QoS measure based on the entire network topology. Also, both papers use the Nash equilibrium solution concept whereas we rely on the pairwise Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability.
Sarangi et al. [13] investigate the effects on network architecture of different distance-based utility functions, but investigate the problem from the standpoint of Nash networks (as developed by Bala and Goyal [14] ) and only consider unilateral link costs. Finally Haller and Sarangi [15] provide characterizations of stable networks under one-sided and two-sided link formation costs for a class of link-based payoffs. We are concerned with a different payoff structure, provide a stronger characterization of stable networks for our specific domain, and focus on the price of anarchy.
THE BILATERAL AND UNILATERAL CONNECTION GAMES
In this section, we present two versions of the Connection Game discussed in this paper: the Unilateral Connection Game (UCG) by Fabrikant et al. [6] and a modified version of the game, including equal-split bilateral link cost shares and mutual consent in link formation, that we call the Bilateral Connection Game (BCG).
Both games have a finite set of players N = {1, ..., n}. The strategy space of player i ∈ N is the list of other players, i.e. the set Si = {(sij) j =i |sij ∈ {0, 1}} where |Si| = 2 n−1 . Player i seeks contact with player j if sij = 1. Players simultaneously announce the list of other players with whom they wish to be connected. Their decisions generate an undirected graph G(s) = (N, A(s)) as per the linking rule of the game. Note carefully that this is a single-stage game with simultaneous announcements.
Therefore, a link (i, j) is formed if either participant in the link decides to establish the connection. In the BCG, on the other hand, A(s) = {(i, j) : i = j, sij = 1 ∧ sji = 1}. That is, both players i and j must agree to establish a link in order for it to be created. Note that the only difference between the two games in the creation of links is this issue of consent.
The cost incurred by player i when all players adopt strategy s is additive in the cost of the number of connections |si| that player i establishes with other agents, as well as in the sum of the costs of reaching all other agents:
where 
NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
In order to characterize the structure of networks resulting from the network formation games discussed above we need to define what constitutes a solution.
When networks arise from the unilateral action of players, as in the UCG, standard Nash equilibrium analysis can be very informative about the structure of networks that emerge. Let s = sN = (si, s N\i ) and let ζ designate the set of all undirected networks on N .
Definition 1. A network G(s) ∈ ζ is a Nash equilibrium network if there exists a strategy s that supports G(s) where
However, when network links require the consent of both parties, as in the BCG, a coordination problem arises: the game displays a multiplicity of Nash equilibria stemming from the cross-multiplication of strategy spaces and players' capacity for mutual blocking in the formation of links. For example, the empty network is always a Nash equilibrium when every agent refuses to establish any link. Put another way, an equilibrium concept that only accounts for single player deviations is insufficient; an appropriate equilibrium concept must consider coalitional moves. A Nash equilibrium outcome that satisfies the additional requirement that it is stable to all bilateral deviations is referred to as a pairwise Nash equilibrium. In the specific context of our network formation game, a pairwise Nash network is 2 We restrict our attention to pure-strategy equilibria of the network formation game for two reasons: because these equilibria are guaranteed to exist and because the network stability notion of pairwise stability that we deal with throughout this paper is only defined deterministically.
one that contains every mutually beneficial connection given the current graph but no more. In considering only bilateral moves, it is the minimal coalitional refinement of Nash required by games with consent and as such represents the minimal level of coordination amongst players. We further justify this solution concept by showing its equivalence with an uncoordinated equilibrium this is robust to small perturbations.
We define the n-square matrix Λ (i,j) with entries λ kl in the following way for the BCG:
where δij is the Dirac-Delta function: δij = {1 if i = j, 0 otherwise}. In words, Λ (i,j) represents the strategy matrix yielding a graph with link (i, j). 3 By an abuse of notation, we will write ΛB to designate the matrix including all links (i, j) ∈ B.
Definition 2. A network G(s) ∈ ζ is a pairwise Nash equilibrium network if there exists a strategy s that supports G(s) as a Nash equilibrium, and for all
Note that the set of Nash and pairwise Nash equilibria coincide in the UCG. The coalitional refinement of Nash in the BCG reduces to Nash in the UCG because the second condition of the definition automatically holds by virtue of link costs being unilateral.
We also introduce the following network stability concept:
The notion of pairwise stability is meant to capture a network's stability to both the deletion and addition of a single link. A link only remains in the graph if it is mutually profitable for both players at either end of the link. Therefore, link severance is unilateral, while link creation is bilateral. Pairwise stability is a network stability concept which is based on the properties of the network itself rather than on the strategic considerations of the player (as in a Nash equilibrium). The concept is appealing because of its ability to generate sharp predictions about the tension between stability and efficiency in many contexts [16] and because it makes it easier to characterize the topology of equilibrium networks.
In fact, in the BCG a pairwise Nash equilibrium is pairwise stable and a pairwise stable network is a pairwise Nash equilibrium network. The first direction is immediate because the conditions for pairwise Nash are sufficient for pairwise stability. This is because the two concepts are identical under the addition of links while pairwise stability only allows an agent to consider the deletion of a single link at a time while pairwise Nash allows for the deletion of any number of links. To prove the other direction we leverage a result due to Calvó-Armengol et al. [19] that holds for convex games. Let Γ ⊆ ζ.
Definition 4. The network cost function ci is convex on Γ if for all G = (N, A(s)) ∈ Γ, all i ∈ N , and B ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ A(s)} we have:
" for the UCG.
Convexity implies that the joint marginal value of a group of links in the network G(s) is greater than the sum of the marginal values of each single link, for all G(s) in Γ.
Proposition 1. A network G(s) ∈ ζ is pairwise stable in the BCG if and only if it is a pairwise Nash equilibrium.
We use the following Lemma to help prove the result.
Lemma 1. The cost function ci for the connection game (CG) is convex on all graphs
o .
In particular, we always have j ∈ ∆ (i,j) (s). Then
Consider the following. First, n
Indeed, for all k ∈ ∆ (i,j) (s), we have
Then both l and j are on two different shortest paths in G(s) between i and k. Consider the shortest path in G(s) between i and k that crosses through l. This path still exists in
Altogether, this implies that:
This proves that ci is convex. 4 This proof is based on a result by Calvó-Armengol et al. [19] showing the same for a similar model called the connections model.
We now show that convexity means that pairwise stability implies pairwise Nash, and establish Proposition 1. Convexity means that for some pairwise stable network G(s), a player has no incentive to delete any of his links. This satisfies the Nash requirement in unilateral deviations. Moreover, by the definition of pairwise stability, ci(s
∈ A(s) and i ∈ N . This satisfies the pairwise Nash condition on link addition. Therefore, G is pairwise Nash.
Still, the concept of a pairwise Nash equilibrium requires some form of explicit player coordination. We can gain further justification for this equilibrium concept by showing the equivalence of pairwise Nash networks to proper equilibrium networks [18] . 
In a proper equilibrium, players play a best response to perturbations of their opponents' strategies, where costly mistakes are made with less probability. Significantly, the concept does not require any ability by players to explicitly coordinate with each other. Myerson [18] showed that every game has a proper equilibrium. Using a result by Calvó-Argmengol et al. [19] , we will establish that all pairwise Nash equilibrium networks in the BCG are proper equilibria. Let ΓPS ⊂ ζ designate the set of pairwise stable networks.
Proposition 2. A network G(s) ∈ ζ is achievable as a proper equilibrium of the BCG if it is pairwise stable for some link cost α, i.e. G(s) ∈ ΓPS.
To show this, we introduce an additional notion of convexity, for link addition and deletion.
Definition 6. A graph G(s) is path convex to single link changes if and only if for all
We will hereafter refer to such a graph as link convex. We now establish a necessary and sufficient condition for a graph to be pairwise stable. 
To see this, note that for link addition, we only require that the link cost α block the least-interested agent involved in the link, i.e. the agent who incurs the least benefit from the new link (i, k). Then α must be more expensive than the largest cost savings to any of these least-interested agents (call this αmin), since otherwise i and k would bilaterally establish that link. On the other hand, α can be no bigger than the minimum reduction in distance costs that any player, say l, would achieve by severing some link to m (call this αmax), otherwise l will unilaterally opt to sever that link. If αmin ≥ αmax, pairwise stability cannot be achieved for the graph G(s).
It follows that G(s) is pairwise stable over the range of link cost α ∈ (αmin, αmax], where αmin = max
and αmax defined as before, if αmax > αmin. This establishes a sufficient condition for pairwise stability.
For the reverse, consider a pairwise stable graph G(s) for which there exists some link
Without loss of generality suppose that there is only one such link. Note that we can de- 
Lemma 3 (Calvó-Armengol et al. [19]). A pairwise Nash network G(s) = (N, A(s)) ∈ ζ where no player consents to the addition of any link (i, j) absent from G(s), i.e. (i, j) / ∈ A(s), is a proper equilibrium.

Corollary 1. A graph G(s) ∈ ζ that is pairwise stable for some link cost α in the BCG is a proper equilibrium network for the same α.
Lemma 2 establishes that any pairwise stable graph is link convex for some α. Moreover, link convexity on the graph means that the convex condition on the formation of new links applies to all players. This implies that the addition of any link is not beneficial to any player, from which condition Lemma 3 establishes that all pairwise stable graphs are proper.
This result shows that all pairwise stable networks are also achievable by a completely non-cooperative strategic equilibration process where agents are playing a sophisticated best-response strategy. This is significant because we can now work with the simple notion of pairwise stability to characterize the set of equilibrium topologies.
STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY OF NETWORKS IN THE BCG
In this section we address the question of what pairwise stability predicts concerning the graphs that might form in the BCG. We proceed as follows: We characterize the set of efficient graphs and provide a partial characterization of topologies that are stable in the bilateral game, with a particular focus on graphs which are not Nash supportable in the UCG in order to show the difference between the outcomes of the two games. We then prove an upper and lower bound on the price of anarchy in the BCG, and show that the worst-case price of anarchy is higher in the BCG than in the UCG. The theoretical analysis in this section is complemented with a careful empirical analysis in Section 5, where we study the average price of anarchy of stable networks in both the BCG and UCG.
In discussing the efficiency of a graph we appeal to the notion of the social cost of a graph. By an abuse of notation we let C(G) designate the social cost C(s) for the graph G (N, A(s) ), and let n = |N |. The social cost of a network G in the BCG is simply the sum of all players' costs, i.e.:
Noting that every pair of non-neighboring vertices is at least distance 2 apart, the following is a lower bound for the social cost of a graph G:
= 2n(n − 1) + 2(α − 1) |A| . The bound is met by any graph G of diameter 2. Proof. To prove the first statement, by Equation 5 , the social optimum is achieved when |A| is maximum. Moreover,
For the second statement, note that any stable graph must be of diameter 1, since the addition of any new link will reduce inter-node distances by at least 1 > α. Then for α < 1, there is no conflict between stability and efficiency. The situation changes for α > 1. This is true in both the BCG and UCG. Indeed, many network formation models [17] exhibit such a transition, where there is no difference between the set of stable and efficient networks for a certain range of link costs whereas there is outside this range.
Lemma 5. For α > 1, the star network is the only efficient graph in the BCG. The star graph is stable, but one of many stable graphs.
Proof. For the first statement, the total cost of k indirect links in a graph G is 2k. For α > 1, the cost from a direct link exceeds the cost from an indirect link of length 2. So direct links must be minimized, as Equation 5 suggests, and the length of all indirect connections must be 2. On the other hand, the connectedness of G requires at least n − 1 direct connections. Given these conditions, the star is the only efficient network. To prove that the star is stable, note that no two non-adjacent agents have any incentive to link directly in a star while no agent wants to disconnect themselves from the graph. That the star is not unique is proven by the different stable topologies that are mentioned in the discussion that follows.
The non-uniqueness of the socially optimal graph as an equilibrium for α > 1 is what motivates our analysis of the cost of the worst-case equilibrium (otherwise called the price of anarchy) of the BCG. In our model, the network is formed endogenously solely by the actions of players, and so this worst case scenario cannot be guarded against.
Explicitly, the price of anarchy ρ of a network G is defined as follows:
In words, it is the ratio of social costs of the graph G to the efficient graph. The price of anarchy of the BCG is the ratio of social costs of the highest cost pairwise stable graph to the efficient graph, i.e.
where ΓPS ⊂ ζ is the set of pairwise stable networks. For α > 1, the price of anarchy of a network G in the BCG is relative to the star graph and is given by:
We now identify the following graphs that are pairwise stable for some α > 1.
Lemma 6. The cycle Cn is pairwise stable for some α and has price ρ(Cn) = O(1).
Proof. Sketch: By link convexity, Cn is pairwise stable if
for n = 4k − 2,
for n = 4k,
We can also show that all strongly regular graphs (see Figure 1 ) where all adjacent vertices have λ > 0 common neighbors, and all non-adjacent vertices have µ > 1 common neighbors are pairwise stable. These graphs also have price of anarchy O(1). The proof is omitted for lack of space.
There are, however, more costly stable networks.
A Lower Bound on the Price of Anarchy
We now establish a lower bound on the price of anarchy of the BCG contingent on the pairwise stability of a class of regular graphs whose order is a constant factor of the Moore bound [22] . The Moore bound establishes an upper limit on the number of nodes n (the order of a graph) in a regular graph graph of degree k and diameter D, i.e. n =
Proposition 3. The worst-case price of anarchy in the BCG is Ω(log 2 α). Proof. Sketch: We first establish that such a graph is link convex. Consider a k-regular graph with shortest cycle (girth) g. The removal of any link will increase the distance of one vertex to g − 1, of k − 1 vertices to g − 2, and so on for all vertices along a path up to g/2 away, leading to a distance cost increase of Sr
. On the other hand, the best-case addition for any link is on the opposite side of a g-cycle.
The addition of such a link will reduce the distance to nodes along two tree paths of depth g/4. That is, the distance cost decrease from adding any link is upper bounded by Sa
Sr > Sa, which establishes link convexity and so that such graphs are pairwise stable for some Sa ≤ α ≤ Sr. We now establish the price of anarchy of such a graph. Consider a generalized Moore polygon, such that from any vertex the number of nodes at distance 0, 1, 2, ..., D is 1, r,  r(r − 1), r(r − 1) 2 , ... with the remaining vertices necessarily in the furthest position, and where D is the diameter of the graph. This assumption is not restrictive since only the highest power matters to establish order, which does not change with this particular construction. Then we have:
where the order of the graph n is a fixed constant times the Moore bound of
. Moreover, the distance cost increase from the removal of any link can be shown to be lower bounded by
Together, we have that n = Θ(k D ) and α = Θ(2 D ). For sufficiently large n, the price of anarchy becomes
This establishes a lower bound on the price of anarchy in the BCG, i.e. ρBCG = Ω(log 2 α).
The result also establishes that extremal graphs, which are the largest k-regular graphs of diameter D, and cage graphs, which are the smallest k-regular graphs of girth g, are pairwise stable for some α. 5 Extremal graphs and cage graphs feature prominently in network design since they have small diameter and exhibit high fault tolerance for nodes with specified degree [20] (see Figure 1 ). As such, it is a good feature that they should appear as stable networks in the BCG. It is also worth mentioning that these graphs are generally not Nash supportable in the UCG.
The condition of link convexity, which characterizes pairwise stable graphs, is a stringent requirement that rules out 5 By the same argument, we believe that these graphs have price of anarchy Ω(log 2 α). We can prove by the same construction that extremal and cage graphs are link convex. However, the Ω(log 2 α) bound holds contingent on these graphs being a constant factor from the Moore bound. Proving this for general k-regular graphs is a notoriously difficult and open problem in graph theory, but is widely conjectured to be true. many graphs. In particular, many asymmetric and nonregular graphs that contain cycles do not qualify. Many symmetric graphs are also inadmissible. For example, while the Desargues graph, a symmetric cubic distance-regular graph on 20 vertices and 30 edges with diameter-to-girth ratio of 2 3 , is link convex, the dodecahedral graph, a symmetric cubic planar graph on 20 vertices and 30 edges with a diameterto-girth ratio of 1 (and so with a higher price of anarchy), is not. See Figure 1 . 
An Upper Bound on the Price of Anarchy
We now provide the following upper bound on the price of anarchy in the BCG. By the same construction, Fabrikant et al. [6] prove an upper bound on the price of anarchy in the UCG.
√ α for every i, j ∈ N since otherwise i and j would bilaterally establish a direct link to bring themselves closer to all nodes more than half way to each other along the shortest path from i to j. So we want to show that |A| = O(
). For any edge ai out of vertex v we will count all vertices u for which (v, u) / ∈ g. Let Ti = {u ∈ N : the shortest path from v to u goes through ai}. We ensure that Ti are disjoint by assuming a canonical shortest path for every vertex. Note that before ai was built, the alternative shortest path from v to u ∈ Ti in G was either infinity or < 2·D(G) < 4 √ α, where D is the diameter of G. In the first case, the graph has two components and we count |Ti| − 1 + |V − Ti| − 1 = n − 2 = Ω( √ α) non-edges, (those incident on v or w and the other component, where ai = (v, w) ). In the second case, d (v,u) 
In either case, non-edges are counted at most twice. Therefore |A| = ( 
The Price of Anarchy in the BCG vs. the UCG
In this section, we quantify and compare the price of anarchy in both the BCG and UCG. In particular we show that the worst-case price of anarchy in the BCG is worse than in the UCG. We begin by establishing the following relations between the equilibrium networks in both games.
Proposition 5. All Nash graphs of the UCG are pairwise stable in the BCG.
Proof. First, a Nash graph G(s) in the UCG is one for which there exists an α such that ci(s−Λs i +Λ s i )−ci(s) ≥ 0, for all s i ∈ Si, s i = si, all i, and where Si is the set of strategies available to i. 6 Next, we generalize the notion of link convexity introduced earlier in the following way: A graph G(s) is fully
i.e. there is an α such that this property holds on the graph G(s). In words, the marginal reduction in shortest path distance costs from any vertex to all other vertices by the addition of a set of links stemming from it is less than the marginal increase in shortest path distance costs for any vertex from the deletion of a set of its links already in the graph. Let f+(s , A) designate the set of matrices constructed by manipulating the initial matrix s by adding some set of links in A :
which is well-defined when A only includes non-zero entries that are not in s . Similarly, let
which is well-defined when A only includes non-zero entries that are in s . Observe that
which means a Nash graph in the UCG is fully path convex. Letting Γ U Nash denote the set of all Nash graphs in the UCG, and ΓFC, the set of all fully path convex graphs, we have Γ U Nash ⊂ ΓFC. Moreover, recall that Proposition 1 establishes the convexity of ci, which implies that a graph G is link convex if and only if it is fully path convex. This completes the proof.
However, not all pairwise stable graphs are Nash. For example, note that the directed cycle Cn for n ≥ 5 (i.e. a situation where node i links to i+1 only, with n−1 linking to 0), is not Nash supportable in the UCG, since node 0 would lower its costs if it instead linked to node 2 only. Yet the 6 Strictly speaking, equality cannot be achieved on the addition of links since ties are broken lexicographically in favor of more links. This convention is implicit in our definition of pairwise stability and we maintain it here. Nevertheless, we express the above condition for a Nash equilibrium in this way as a matter of convenience. cycle has already been proven to be a stable configuration of the BCG.
Corollary 2. The worst-case price of anarchy in the BCG is weakly worse than in the UCG.
The result follows from the previous proposition. Moreover, Fabrikant et al. [6] conjecture that all Nash equilibria in the UCG are trees for some α > A, where A is some appropriate constant. Armed with this conjecture, the price of anarchy of the UCG is shown to be constant, i.e. ρUCG = O( √ A). But the case for the BCG has already been shown to be quite different, the case of extremal graphs being a counterexample to a tree conjecture for the BCG. In this case, the worst-case price of anarchy in the BCG is strictly worse than in the UCG.
Discussion
The best-response dynamic in the UCG is much more powerful than in the BCG. The problem of mutual blocking in the formation of new links in the BCG and the limited capacity to coordinate afforded to players under pairwise stability means that players are much less able to react to the positive externalities of other players' links, which is the root cause of the tension between stability and efficiency in the connection game for α > 1. This has two major consequences.
On the one hand, the set of pairwise stable network geometries in the BCG is much richer than the set of Nash equilibrium network shapes admitted in the UCG. For example, extremal and cage graphs, which feature prominently in many communication network designs, are pairwise stable in the BCG but not generally Nash supportable in the UCG.
7
On the other hand, the limited capacity of players in the BCG to react to externalities in the game is what drives the 7 With the notable exception of the Petersen graph ((3, 5)-cage), which constitutes a weak Nash equilibrium of the unilateral game for 1 ≤ α ≤ 4. social cost of an equilibrium graph in the BCG to be worse than in the UCG.
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE AVERAGE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section we quantify the difference between the price of anarchy of equilibrium networks in the BCG and the UCG over the set of stable networks, as opposed to only the worst case network. In particular, we want to capture the difference between the average price of anarchy of equilibrium networks in both games for a given α. Solving for a Nash network in the UCG and a pairwise stable network in the BCG are both NP -complete problems [6] [21] . Given the intractability of providing a full characterization of all stable networks in both games for a large number of players, we restrict our attention to small networks. On the other hand, we want to consider a large enough setting so that the multiplicity of equilibria will bring out the difference between the BCG and UCG. In what follows we consider a setting with 10 agents. We compute all pairwise stable graphs in the BCG and Nash graphs in the UCG by exhaustive enumeration of all connected topologies on 10 vertices. 8 We normalize the link cost in the two games with respect to the full cost of a link in the graph, so that α in the plots corresponds to α = α in UCG but α = α 2 in BCG. Figure 2 shows the average price of anarchy of equilibrium networks in the BCG and UCG for different link cost values. The general increase in the price of anarchy of equilibrium networks in both games for intermediate link costs is explained by the multiplicity of suboptimal equilibria. Recall that all equilibrium networks are trees for α > n 2 and have cost O (1) , since the addition of any link to a tree is too expensive. In contrast, for intermediate link costs many more inefficient topologies are admitted to the stable set (in addition to the efficient graph).
The picture corroborates the analysis earlier in the paper, illustrating a stark difference between the topologies of graphs admitted by the BCG and UCG. In addition, we now see that when links are inexpensive, the average price of equilibrium networks in the BCG is lower than for the UCG. However, as links become more expensive the situation changes: pairwise stable networks in the BCG are generally more inefficient than Nash networks in the UCG.
Whereas in the BCG the agents can get stuck in a badly suboptimal configuration, the ability of agent in the UCG to arbitrarily change their outgoing links means players can place fewer well-placed links. As links become more expensive, this leads to overconnected and increasingly inefficient graphs in the BCG.
Indeed, the plot in Figure 3 shows that equilibrium graphs in the BCG contain more edges than graphs in the UCG on average for all link costs. As links become more expensive, graphs with more edges are increasingly over-connected and increasingly inefficient.
CONCLUSION
We presented a bilateral consent-driven model of network formation. The worst-case price of anarchy in the bilateral connection game is at least as bad as for the unilateral game where consent is not required. It is strictly worse contingent on a conjecture on the price of anarchy in the unilateral connection game put forth by Fabrikant et al. [6] that claims that the price of anarchy in the unilateral game is constant, whereas we prove a lower bound of Ω(log 2 α) for the worstcase price of anarchy in the bilateral game. Empirical analysis of equilibrium networks in the two games also suggests that the worst-case is strictly worse in the bilateral game. Finally, we show empirically that while the average efficiency of networks in the bilateral setting is better than in the unilateral setting when links are inexpensive, the situation is reversed when links become more expensive. Altogether, the comparative results suggest that worst-case equilibrium networks have a higher price of anarchy in a consent-driven network formation setting where players are limited in their ability to coordinate simultaneously than when consent is not required and players are unconstrained in their ability to act selfishly.
Our investigations into the role of consent in network formation suggest that the rules of engagement strongly affect the set of possible equilibria. We are currently investigating how bilateral and multilateral transfers between players may help mediate the price of anarchy in the connection game. We are also interested in extending the game to a setting where the network formation is dynamic and on-going. The dynamics of network formation can be controlled by an intermediary, subject to equilibrium constraints suggested by the dynamic network formation process.
